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Abstract
A5/1 is a shift register based stream cipher which
uses a majority clocking rule to update its registers.
It is designed to provide privacy for the GSM system.
In this paper, we analyse the initialisation process
of A5/1. We demonstrate a sliding property of the
A5/1 cipher, where every valid internal state is also
a legitimate loaded state and multiple key-IV pairs
produce phase shifted keystream sequences. We de-
scribe a possible ciphertext only attack based on this
property.
keywords: A5/1, initialisation process, resynchro-
nisation, slide attacks, stream cipher.
1 Introduction
The privacy of mobile telephone communications is
protected by the A5/1 stream cipher. A5/1 is used
as a world wide standard for mobile phone encryption.
The approximate design of A5/1 was leaked in 1994
and the exact design revealed in 1999, when it was
reverse engineered by Briceno [6]. A5/1 is a bit-based
stream cipher that takes a 64-bit secret key and 22-bit
IV (frame number) as inputs into the 64-bit internal
state. The state is contained in three shift registers.
Slid pairs in stream ciphers were first discussed by
by Biryukov and Wagner [4]. This research considers
specifically the interaction between the initialisation
and the keystream generation processes of A5/1 that
can produce slid pairs, with a particular focus on slid
pairs generated by a single secret key and different
IV’s.
Most recent stream cipher proposals require an ini-
tialisation process as an essential part of the stream
ciphers’ specification. During the initialisation pro-
cess, a secret key, k, and an initialisation vector (IV),
v, are loaded into the registers to form a loaded state.
This is then processed to diffuse k and v across the
internal state. A good initialisation process should
ensure that keystream formed from the same key but
different IV’s does not reveal information about the
secret key. In this paper, we demonstrate that a slid
pair can be used to leak some information about the
secret key using the properties of the initialisation and
keystream generation processes of the A5/1 cipher.
For stream ciphers, it is sometimes possible to
find different key-IV pairs that produce phase shifted
This paper appeared at Australasian Information Security Con-
ference (ACSW-AISC), Adelaide, Australia. It is published
as Conferences in Research and Practice in Information Tech-
nology, Vol. 138, Eds. C. Thomborson and U. Parampalli.
Reproduction for academic, not-for profit purposes permitted
provided this text is included.
keystream [4, 7, 18, 21, 24], since stream ciphers use
finite state machines (with predefined state update
functions) to perform the initialisation and keystream
generation processes. We refer to the loaded states
formed from these key-IV values as slid pairs. This
is the case for A5/1. For a given key it may be
possible to find multiple IV’s that result in phase
shifted keystreams. An attacker may use these shifted
keystreams from frames in the same conversation to
reveal some information about the secret key.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 de-
scribes slide attacks in stream ciphers. Section 3
presents a full description of the A5/1 stream cipher.
Section 4 gives a brief review of previous attacks on
A5/1. A theoretical analysis of slid pairs in the A5/1
cipher is presented in Section 5. Section 6 presents
the experimental results and some examples of the
theoretical analysis. Section 7 presents a practical
procedure using slid pairs to attack A5/1. Section 8
concludes the paper.
2 Resynchronisation and Slide Attacks
The slide attack is a generic attack which was first
applied to block ciphers by Biryukov and Wagner in
1999 [4] and 2000 [5]. The slide attack has also been
applied to stream ciphers that are based on block ci-
phers such as LEX cipher [23] and WAKE-ROFB [4]
and more recently to other stream ciphers, such as
Grain [7, 18, 24] and Trivium [21].
In the case of stream ciphers, during initialisation
a key-IV pair is loaded into an internal state, to form
a loaded state. The state is updated for α itera-
tion(s). If a state that is obtained from this process
can also be obtained as a loaded state for another key-
IV pair then the two loaded states form a slid pair.
Figure 1 illustrates the initialisation and keystream
generation processes resulting in two keystream se-
quences shifted by α bit(s). The relationship between
the two keystreams z and z′ is given by Equation 1.
(k, v) =⇒ z (1)
(k′, v′) =⇒ z′, where z′ = z  α
Slid pairs can lead to phase shifted keystream
when the initialisation and key stream generation pro-
cesses have the following properties:
a) Iterations of the initialisation process are the
same as each other.
b) Iterations of the keystream generation process are
the same as each other.
c) State update functions for both the initialisation
and keystream generation processes have a degree
of similarity.
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Figure 1: Slid pairs and stream ciphers
Most stream ciphers follow the (a) and (b) condi-
tions above, but there is a wide variety in the extent
to which condition (c) applies. For the Grain family
of stream ciphers [14, 16, 15] the functions differ and
for the Trivium stream cipher [8] the functions are
identical.
Grain v1.0 [16] was analyzed [18] to find slid pairs.
For any key-IV pair (k, v) there exists a related (k′, v′)
pair which generates a 1-bit shifted keystream with
probability of 2−2. In general, for a key-IV pair,
(k, v), there exists a related (k′, v′) pair which gen-
erates an n-bit shifted keystream with probability of
2−2n [7]. Zhang and Wang [24] demonstrated some
sliding weak key-IV combination that apply to vari-
ous members of the Grain family of ciphers.
The Trivium stream cipher [8] was analyzed by
Priemuth-Schmid and Biryukov [21] in 2008. They
found that for a key-IV pair, (k, v), there exists a
related (k′, v′) pair which generates a 111-bit shifted
keystream for more than 239 out of 280 keys.
The A5/1 cipher satisfies all three conditions
above. In fact, like Trivium, the state update func-
tions during the diffusion phase of initialisation and
during keystream generation are identical. So, this ci-
pher is an obvious candidate for the existence of slid
pairs. Moreover, every valid internal state is also a
legitimate loaded state, so for A5/1, slid pairs can
occur at any distance α ≥ 1.
Application of slid pairs
Slid pairs can be used to attack some stream ciphers.
The complexity of attacks may depend on the combi-
nation of key-IV’s. The three possible cases of key-IV
combinations that produce the slid pairs in stream
ciphers are:
Case 1 The same secret key and different IV’s pro-
duce out of phase keystream sequences. That is
(k, v) and (k, v′) produce z and z′ respectively,
where z′ = z  α.
Case 2 Different secret keys and different IV’s pro-
duce out of phase keystream sequences. That is
(k, v) and (k′, v′) produce z and z′ respectively,
where z′ = z  α.
Case 3 Different secret keys and the same IV pro-
duce out of phase keystream sequences. That is
(k, v) and (k′, v) produce z and z′ respectively,
where z′ = z  α.
Whenever slid pairs generate shifted keystream,
e.g. z′ = z  α, the corresponding ciphertexts can
be combined to reveal some of the message content;
for example, consider messages m1 and m2 where m1
is encrypted using z and a second message m2 is en-
crypted using z′ to give f1 and f2 respectively. Then:
(f1  α)⊕ f2 = (m1  α)⊕m2
As shown in [9], it is possible to attack an XOR
combination of form (m1  α) ⊕ m2 using the re-
dundancy of the plaintext. Furthermore, when this
occurs for Case 1 this may leak information about
the secret key. This is the case for A5/1 cipher, as
we show in Section 7. From a cryptographic perspec-
tive, Case 1 is the most important flaw for attack-
ers, because this situation can occur between separate
frames of a single message particularly on a frame
based channel such as GSM, where the same secret
key is used for each frame in a communication with
different IV’s.
3 Description of A5/1
A5/1 [3, 12] is a bit based stream cipher which uses
three binary LFSRs, denoted A, B and C, with
lengths of 19, 22 and 23 bits respectively, giving a
state size of 64 bits. Each LFSR has a primitive
feedback polynomial. Let S denote the internal state
of A5/1 and let SA, SB and SC denote the inter-
nal states for the components registers A, B and C
respectively. Let sia,t denote the contents of stage i
of register A at time t, for 0 ≤ i ≤ 18, sib,t denote
the contents of stage i of register B at time t, for
0 ≤ i ≤ 21, sic,t denote the contents of stage i of
register C at time t, for 0 ≤ i ≤ 22.
A secret key of 64 bits is used for each conversation
and a 22-bit frame number is used as the IV for each
frame. Let ki denote the secret key for 0 ≤ i ≤ 63 and
vi denote the IV for 0 ≤ i ≤ 21. The three registers
are regularly clocked during loading of the key and IV
(frame number), while a majority clocking mechanism
is used for the diffusion phase and for keystream gen-
eration. The use of majority clocking implicitly intro-
duces nonlinearity to the keystream sequence. This
is the only nonlinear operation performed.
To implement the majority clocking scheme, each
register has a clocking tap: stages s8a,t, s
10
b,t and s
10
c,t.
The contents of these stages determine which regis-
ters will be clocked at the next iteration: those reg-
isters for which the clock control bits agree with the
majority value are clocked. For example, if s8a,t = 0,
s10b,t = 1 and s
10
c,t = 0, then the majority value is 0
and registers A and C are clocked. Thus, either two
or three registers are clocked at each step. Figure 2
shows a pictorial diagram of the A5/1 stream cipher.
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Figure 2: A5/1 Stream cipher.
3.1 Initialisation process
The initialisation process is conducted in two phases
as follows.
3.1.1 Loading phase
At the beginning, all stages of the three registers are
set to zero. Each linear feedback shift register is reg-
ularly clocked 64 times as each key bit, ki, is XORed
with the register feedback to form the new value of
stage s0. Following this, each register is regularly
clocked 22 times as the IV is loaded in the same man-
ner [3]. At the end of the loading phase, the registers
are in the loaded state. Note that the state update
function during the loading phase is entirely linear.
That is, the content of each stage in each register are
independent linear combinations of key and IV bits.
3.1.2 Diffusion phase
The diffusion phase involves performing 100 iterations
of the initialisation state update function using the
majority clocking scheme. At the end of diffusion
phase the cipher is in its initial state and is ready for
keystream generation.
3.2 Keystream Generation
Keystream generation comprises 228 iterations using
the same majority clocking rule used during the dif-
fusion phase. In each iteration, the keystream bit is
obtained by XORing the output bit of the three reg-
isters zt = s
18
a,t ⊕ s21b,t ⊕ s22c,t.
Each 228-bit telephone frame is sent every 4.6 mil-
liseconds as a communication between two parties A
and B, with each frame consisting of 114 bits to com-
municate from A to B and another 114 bits to com-
municate from B to A.
4 Previous Attacks
As it is widely used, the A5/1 cipher has received
the attention of cryptanalysts for several years. This
section gives a brief overview of the previous security
analysis of A5/1.
- Golic´ [12, 13] discussed an application of divide-
and-conquer attack with average computational
complexity of 240 based on the solution of a sys-
tem of linear equations. Then, he used a time-
memory trade-off attack based on the birthday
paradox with T ·M ≥ 263.32, where T and M are
the required computational time and memory (of
128-bit word) respectively. The result, 263.32 is
based on the number of reachable states after
one clock. This attack requires a huge amount of
memory for the precomputational process.
- Biryukov, Shamir, and Wagner [3] described an
improved time-memory trade-off attack. This at-
tack requires a few seconds to a few minutes to
attack A5/1 using a precomputation memory of
150 to 300 GB and 242 to 248 steps.
- Biham and Dunkelman [2] attacked A5/1 using
a given 220.8 bits of the keystream within 239.91
clocks. This attack is feasible but it requires a
lot of asymptotic processes.
- Ekdahl-Johansson [10] reported an attack which
is based on the correlation attack. This attack
is independent of the the shift registers length
but dependent on the number of iterations during
initialisation process. It exploits the weak key
initialisation of A5/1. It requires around 5 min
conversation to attack in 5 min with success rate
more than 70%.
- Maximov, Johansson and Babbage [20] de-
scribed improvements to the Ekdahl-Johansson
attack [10]. The resulting attack needs less than
a minute of computations and a few seconds of
known conversation. The performance of this at-
tack varies depending on the strategy used.
- Gendrullis, Novotny` and Rupp [11] demon-
strated a real world attack for A5/1 based
on [17], performed by a special hardware de-
vice. It requires 64 consecutive keystream bits
and takes 6 hours on average (12 hours maxi-
mum) to obtain the secret key.
Most of the attacks outlined above require known-
plaintext while our attack can be conducted using ci-
phertext alone to identify the secret key.
5 Analysis of Initialisation Processes
The A5/1 stream cipher has a 64-bit internal state
and uses a 64-bit secret key and a 22-bit IV to form
a loaded state. So, there are 264 possible internal
states. Since the loading phase is linear, it is clear
that each loaded state can be obtained from multiple
key-IV pairs.
By analysing the loading phase (which uses regular
clocking), we can see that each loaded state can be
obtained from 222 different key-IV combinations. A
given loaded state can be formed from 222 different
keys with appropriate IV’s.
As the number of possible internal states is the
same as the number of loaded states, it is clear that
an internal state obtained after a certain number of
iterations α, is also a legitimate loaded state. That is
for any α > 0, we can always find two different key-IV
pairs which produce a slid pair separated by α clocks.
Further, since the update functions during diffusion
and keystream generation are identical, this slid pair
will always produce keystream sequences which are
out of phase by α bits.
5.1 Loading Phase
As the operation of the LFSRs during the loading
phase is linear, it can easily be represented in terms
of matrix operations. An analysis of the matrices
involved then enables us to identify the conditions
under which a slid pair can occur. We conduct our
analysis under the assumption that we are looking for
slid pairs in which both loaded states were generated
from the same secret key (but necessarily with differ-
ent IV’s).
We first note that the autonomous operation of
each LFSR can be described in terms of a matrix
equation [19] as follows. Suppose that the stages of
the register are denoted as s0, s1, . . . sd and that the
update function can be represented as
s0t+1 = c0s
0
t ⊕ c1s1t ⊕ . . . cdsdt
sjt+1 = s
j−1
t 1 ≤ j ≤ d
Putting St = [s
0 s1 . . . sd]ᵀ, the register update
(clocking) operation can be represented by the equiv-
alent matrix equation
St+1 = CSt where C =

c0 c1 . . . . . . cd−1 cd
1 0 . . . . . . 0 0
0 1 . . . . . . 0 0
...
...
. . .
. . .
...
...
0 0 . . . . . . 0 0
0 0 . . . . . . 1 0

is the state transition matrix of the register.
During the loading of the key into the register, the
register state update function is given by
St+1 = CSt ⊕ σkt
where σ = [1 0 . . . 0]ᵀ indicates that the new key bit
is XORed into the feedback of the LFSR. If we take
t = τ to indicate the register state before loading com-
mences and iterate this process several times, from
t = τ to t = τ + l (where l denotes the key length),
we have
Sτ+1 = CSτ ⊕ σk0
Sτ+2 = C(CSτ ⊕ σk0)⊕ σk1 = C2Sτ ⊕ Cσk0 ⊕ σk1
...
Sτ+l = C
lSτ ⊕ Cl−1σk0 ⊕ Cl−2σk1 ⊕ . . .⊕ Cσkl−2
⊕ σkl−1
= ClSτ ⊕NK
where N = [Cl−1σ Cl−2σ . . . Cσ σ] and K =
[k0 k1 . . . kl−2 kl−1]ᵀ.
The above analysis can be extended easily to cases
such as A5/1, which have three LFSRs, by denoting
the states of the three registers as SA, SB and SC ,
and their state transition matrices as CA, CB and
CC , and defining the state transition matrix of the
combined system in matrix block form as
C =
 CA 0 00 CB 0
0 0 CC
 acting on [ SASB
SC
]
Likewise, denoting the σ and N matrices of each
register as σA, σB , σC and NA, NB , NC , the com-
bined σ and N matrices for the whole system can be
defined as
σ =
 σAσB
σC
 and N =
 NANB
NC

With these modifications, the equation above, Sτ+l =
ClSτ ⊕ NK, is also valid for the combined system.
Noting that Sτ = [0 0 . . . 0]
ᵀ for the registers of A5/1,
this equation reduces to Sτ = NK.
A similar analysis can also be undertaken for load-
ing the IV bits into the LFSRs. For a 64-bit key and
a 22-bit IV, we have
Sτ+64 = NK
Sτ+86 = C
22NK ⊕MV
where M = [C21σ C20σ . . . Cσ σ] and V =
[v0 v1 . . . v20 v21]
ᵀ.
5.2 Diffusion Phase
We now set τ = −86, so that S0 represents the loaded
state of the system, and consider the behaviour of
A5/1 during the mixing phase. During this phase,
the registers of A5/1 are clocked using a majority
clocking rule, so for a single iteration, there are four
different clocking cases to consider. These are:
Case 1 All registers are clocked
Case 2 Registers A and B are clocked
Case 3 Registers A and C are clocked
Case 4 Registers B and C are clocked
For each of these cases, there will be a different
state transition matrix (Cx say) for the system, as
follows:
for case 1: Cx = C, as defined previously
for case 2: Cx = Cab =
[
CA 0 0
0 CB 0
0 0 I
]
for case 3: Cx = Cac =
[
CA 0 0
0 I 0
0 0 CC
]
for case 4: Cx = Cbc =
[
I 0 0
0 CB 0
0 0 CC
]
Now suppose that we are looking for slid pairs with
a slide distance of α = 1 in which both loaded states
arise from the same secret key. We have
S1 = CxS0 with S0 = C
22NK ⊕MV
Now if S1 is also a loaded state for the same key
K and different IV, V ′ , we have
S1 = C
22NK ⊕MV ′
and hence
MV ⊕MV ′ = S0 ⊕ S1
or M∆ = (I ⊕ Cx)S0
= (I ⊕ Cx)(C22NK ⊕MV ) (2)
where ∆ = V ⊕ V ′ = [δ0 δ1 . . . δ21]ᵀ.
For each of these cases, we can use Equation 2, to-
gether with the conditions guaranteeing the relevant
type of clocking, to determine a set of conditions on
the various bits of ∆, K and V that must be satis-
fied in order for a slid pair to occur in the manner
described above.
The state transition matrices form the new state
contents of the three registers after α iteration(s) as
shown by the following equations. There are 4 pos-
sible state transition matrices to transfer from the
current state to the next one. Therefore, the total
number of possible state transition matrices from the
beginning of diffusion phase at t = 0 to the required
number of iteration(s) α can be determined as 22α.
For α = 1, M∆ = (Cx ⊕ I)S0
where Cx can be C, Cab, Cac or Cbc for each of the
four different cases respectively.
For α = 2, M∆ = (CxCy ⊕ I)S0
where each of the Cx and Cy can be C, Cab, Cac or
Cbc, resulting in 16 cases
For α = 3, M∆ = (CxCyCz ⊕ I)S0
where each of the Cx, Cy and Cz can be C, Cab, Cac
or Cbc, resulting in 64 cases
Equation 2 is analysed using Gaussian Elimination
to find the conditions mentioned above. We start
with a matrix (M) with dimension (64 × 22) and a
vector (∆) of 22 elements in the left side and in the
right side a matrix (C22N ||M) with dimension (64×
86) and a vector (K||V ) of 86 elements. Gaussian
Elimination is applied to the M matrix to determine
the relationship between deltas {δ0, δ1 . . . δ21} and the
key-IV bits. This is obtained from the top 22 rows.
This relationship forms the second IV, v′. The last 42
rows are the bases of the conditions that are required
to get slid pairs. It consists of 42 equations of 86
variables, with each equation equal to zero.
6 Experimental Results
This section focuses on finding slid pairs of A5/1 for
α = 1 and 2 only. The analysis is performed by ex-
amining Equation 2 for each clocking case. For each
clocking case, we find slid pairs for the same secret key
(where the secret key is fixed for both slid pairs) with
different IV’s and describe the relationship between
the first IV, v, and second IV, v′. This relationship
is key dependent. In addition, the secret key is ex-
pressed as a relationship between some key bits and
other bits from both the key and the first IV, v.
6.1 For α = 1
Keystream sequences shifted by one bit can be ob-
tained from two different pairs (same key with differ-
ent IV’s). Based on the analysis of Equation 2 de-
scribed above, Table 1 shows the number of key and
IV bits that must be specified to form a 64-bit secret
key that results in 1-bit shifted keystream for each of
the four cases. Table 2 shows two examples of slid
pairs (in hex) for a secret key with two different IV’s
that generate keystream sequences that are shifted by
one bit. Note: the bits {0} and {1} are the shifted bits
(in binary) between these two keystream sequences in
each case. Note also that the final byte of keystream
only contains three or four bits, and that these are
treated as MSBs in each case. The keystream length
is 228 bits and due to the one bit shift, the two se-
quences contain a common 227-bit sequence.
For case 1, a 64-bit secret key is formed from 20
free key bits (k42, k44, k45, k47 to k63) and 4 IV bits
(v0, v3, v11⊕v13). These 24 bits specify the remaining
44 key bits using the equation in Appendix A. The
rest of the IV bits are free to be chosen and do not
cases 1 2 3 4
free key bits 20 22 21 20
Involved IV bits 4 22 22 22
Table 1: slid pairs after 1 clock
key 0x2D37B6F7292DFFFB
IV1 0x200000
IV2 0xE05A00
Keystream1 {0}0x5E449A6F3414F3CD76F567275D31CFE1A4F4AE4F4D3C954D3CB124D9A
Keystream2 0x5E449A6F3414F3CD76F567275D31CFE1A4F4AE4F4D3C954D3CB124D9A
key 0xF77832CC89EFFFFB
IV1 0x200000
IV2 0x4001A4
Keystream1 {1}0xF798818F32A6B4772F5B2E55B8808541301E49CA76B11BC46F65C1494
Keystream2 0xF798818F32A6B4772F5B2E55B8808541301E49CA76B11BC46F65C1494
Table 2: Two keystreams shifted by 1 bit generated from
same key and different IV
affect the secret key. Therefore, by choosing all possi-
ble values for the 20 free key bits and the 22 IV bits,
the total number of slid pairs for case 1 is 242 and the
probability that a randomly chosen key satisfies these
equations for a given IV is 2−44.
The total number of slid pairs in each of Cases
2, 3 and 4 can be calculated similarly, and the total
numbers of slid pairs are 244, 243 and 242 respectively.
Therefore, the total number of slid pairs after 1 clock
(for the 4 cases combined) is 245. Likewise, the prob-
ability that a randomly chosen key satisfies the equa-
tions for any of these cases (for a given IV) is found
to be 2−41.
6.2 For α = 2
For the case when α = 2, 2-bit shifted keystream
sequences can be obtained from two different pairs
(same key with different IV’s) that are out of phase
by two bits, as shown by an analysis similar to Equa-
tion 2. Table 3 gives the number of key and IV bits
that form a 64-bit secret key that results in keystream
sequences shifted by two bits for each of the 16 cases.
Note the case number is denoted as i j, where i and j
denote the case of first clock and the second clock re-
spectively. Table 4 shows an example of a slid pair in
hex for a secret key with two different IV’s that gen-
erate sequences which are shifted by two bits. Note:
the bits {01} are the shifted bits (in binary) between
these 2 keystream sequences. The keystream length
is 228 bits and due to the shift of two bits, the two
keystream sequences contain a common 226 bit se-
quence.
cases 1 1 1 2 1 3 1 4 2 1 2 2 2 3
Free key bits 18 18 18 18 18 22 18 . . .
Involved IV bits 7 22 22 22 22 22 22
2 4 3 1 3 2 3 3 3 4 4 1 4 2 4 3 4 4
. . . 18 18 18 21 18 18 18 18 21
22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22
Table 3: slid pairs after 2 clocks
Slid pairs after 2 clocks can occur in 16 different
cases as shown in Table 3. Numbers of slid pairs can
be calculated in a manner similar to that used for
α = 1. We found that the total number of slid pairs
for α = 2 (for the 16 cases combined) is 245.49 =
240+ 240+ 240+ 240+ 240+ 244+ 240+ 240+ 240+
240+ 243+ 240+ 240+ 240+ 240+ 243. Likewise, the
probability that a randomly chosen key satisfies the
key 0x1DCCC463432BFFFB
IV1 0x200000
IV2 0xC36D70
Keystream1 {01}0x916F6D486AF626F3247A77C97846CAED1D6D35B95D712F89B6B11EEB0
Keystream2 0x916F6D486AF626F3247A77C97846CAED1D6D35B95D712F89B6B11EEB1
Table 4: Two keystreams shifted by 2 bit generated from
same key and different IV
equations for any of these cases (for a given IV) is
found to be 2−40.51.
Similarly, this work can be extended for a greater
number of iterations to analyse the occurrence of the
slid pairs in the A5/1 cipher such as for α = 3, 4, . . ..
The number of cases to be analysed increases as the
value of α increases to 22α as mentioned in Section 5.
7 Attack Procedure
Since A5/1 has a 64-bit key and a 64-bit internal
state, it is not feasible to simply guess the whole secret
key that generates the keystream and check whether
the guess is correct or not. However, if it is possible
to identify the occurrence of a slid pair, the resulting
relationship can be used to reduce the number of key
bits that need to be guessed, forming the basis for an
attack. We outline the procedure for such an attack.
For each conversation there is a secret key and a
series of IV’s (frame numbers). Initialisation with a
new IV (rekeying) is performed after every 228 bits
of keystream, that is, every 4.6 msec. The total
time elapsed to use all 222 possible frame numbers
is around 5 hours and 22 minutes. The first exam-
ple in Table 2 shows that a slid pair for that specific
secret key occurs after 2.51 minutes.
For the attack, we focus on the most useful at-
tack scenario for an attacker: ciphertext-only. This
scenario assumes the attacker is able to get enough
encrypted speech (ciphertext) and also that the IV’s
(frame numbers) are known.
We describe the algorithm for one bit shifted ver-
sions of keystream. However, it can be extended to
other shifts as well. The algorithm depends on iden-
tifying where an unknown key k is used for two en-
crypted frames with known IV’s v and v′ such that
the resulting keystreams are shifted versions of one
another. We want to identify this from knowledge
of encrypted frames alone. If we XOR an encrypted
frame and a one-bit shifted version of a second en-
crypted frame where the two keystreams are out of
phase by one, the result is the XOR combination of
two plaintext frames. The XOR combination of plain-
text frames can be easily identified due to the redun-
dancy of plaintext [9]. This is critical in step 2 of the
four step algorithm presented below. Note that our
aim is to find the secret key rather than to decrypt an
individual frame. The attack algorithm is as follows:
Attacking Algorithm
Step 1: Divide the encrypted speech (ciphertext)
into separate frames. Each ciphertext frame cor-
responds to a different IV.
Step 2: Obtain fi ⊕ fj  1 for every available pair
of frames for 0 ≤ i 6= j ≤ 222 and use the re-
dundancy of speech to determine whether shifted
keystream is present, where fi and fj are the i
th
and jth encrypted frame respectively.
• If so, note the IV’s of the relevant frames.
• If not, the algorithm fails for the entire con-
versation.
Step 3: If shifted keystream has been identified, find
a candidate key, k∗, by guessing and checking
each possible key, as follows:
For each of cases 1, 2, 3, and 4 do:
• Guess the free key bits in the relevant set of
equations in Appendix A.
• Use these free key bits and the known IV’s
to obtain the remaining key bits using the
equations of Appendix A.
• Use the candidate key k∗ with any avail-
able IVs to generate keystreams for several
frames using the A5/1 algorithm.
• Try to decrypt the frames from the previous
step using the generated keystreams.
– If decryption is successful, the candi-
date key for this conversation is equiv-
alent to the actual key.
– If not, repeat the process for another
guess.
Step 4: Use the secret key with known IV’s to de-
crypt the entire intercepted ciphertext.
In step 2 : it is possible that multiple pairs of
frames will be identified due to the state convergence
in A5/1 [22].
In step 3 : if two encrypted frames have been
identified as shifted keystream, then the guessing pro-
cess should cover the four cases 1, 2, 3 and 4 to find
the correct secret key. As shown in Table 1, it re-
quires to guess 20, 22, 21, 20 bits for cases 1, 2, 3 and
4 respectively. For each guess, it requires to substi-
tute the guessed key bits into the relevant equations
in Appendix A to find the remaining key bits. At
this time, it is not clear whether the candidate key
is correct or not. The proposed key must be verified
to decrypt any encrypted frame. Random frames are
chosen with known IVs to generate keystreams using
the proposed secret key. If the keystreams decrypt
the frames correctly then the candidate key is cor-
rect, if not use another guess until the correct key is
found or all candidates are exhausted.
Note that the above algorithm is for 1-bit shifts.
If this fails, then it is possible to try for 2-bit shifts
or more. The process is the same with a slight modi-
fication in Step 2 only.
Attacking Complexity
For step 2 : The complexity of our attack depends
essentially on the number of comparisons required in
Step 2. If there are N frames in the targeted con-
versation, then up to N · (N − 1) comparisons must
be performed and each comparison must be done in
both directions (fi ⊕ fj  1) and (fi  1⊕ fj).
For a conversation involving all 222 possible IVs
(222 frames ≈ 5 hours 22 minutes), there will be up
to 222(222 − 1) ≈ 244 comparisons and the success
probability (the probability that the secret key used
in this conversation forms a slid pair using two of
these IVs) is approximately 2−19. For a shorter con-
versation, the probability that a slid pair will occur
among the available frames decreases in proportion
to the number of comparisons performed, so with N
frames of conversation the probability of success will
be approximately N · (N − 1) · 2−63. Table 5 gives
some examples of the number of comparisons and the
probability of success for various lengths of conversa-
tion.
For step 3 : If Step 2 of the attack is successful
in finding a slid pair of the kind we are seeking, then
Step 3 will require up to 44× 223 ≈ 228.46 additional
calculations to find the correct secret key.
No of Comparison Probability Guessing
frame time complexity of success required
214 1min 16sec 228 2−35 228.46
216 5min 2sec 232 2−31 228.46
218 20min 6sec 236 2−27 228.46
220 1h 21min 240 2−23 228.46
222 5h 22min 244 2−19 228.46
Table 5: Complexity of various length of conversation
Similarly for α = 2, the probability that the secret
key used in this conversation forms a slid pair using
one of the 222 possible IVs is approximately 2−18.51.
For shorter conversation, the probability that a slid
pair may occur among the available frames is approx-
imately N · (N − 1) · 2−62.51.
In a known-plaintext attack [1], the attacker has
a number of plaintext and ciphertext pairs, and the
keystream sequences are known, z = m ⊕ f . There-
fore, the attacker can check directly for the pres-
ence of shifted keystream instead of using the redun-
dancy property of the messages and Step 3 is un-
changed. The total complexity is almost the same
as the ciphertext-only attack scenario, except for the
time for checking redundancy.
8 Conclusion
The occurrence of slid pairs and shifted keystream
sequences in a stream cipher depends on the similar-
ity of the state update functions and the similarity
of each iteration in the initialisation and keystream
generation processes. The A5/1 cipher satisfies these
three conditions, since the loading phase process uses
a purely linear function and the diffusion phase and
keystream generation use identical nonlinear func-
tions. Additionally, as the state space for A5/1 is 264,
every internal state is a loaded state. Therefore, slid
pairs exist for this cipher and these slid pairs always
lead to shifted keystream sequences.
In this paper, we searched for slid pairs arising
from the use of the same key and multiple IV’s.
The slid pairs produce shifted keystream sequences.
In each iteration using majority clocking, the A5/1
stream cipher has four possible cases; the registers
clocked are (A,B,C), (A,B), (A,C) or (B,C). As
shown previously in this paper, the total number of
this type of slid pair that can occur after one clock
is 245, and the probability of getting these slid pairs
(for α = 1) for a randomly chosen secret key over 222
IV’s is 2−19.
The analysis can be extended to the case of α = 2.
The total number of this type of slid pair is 245.49 and
the probability of getting these slid pairs for α = 2
for a randomly chosen secret key is 2−18.51.
The above results apply when a full 222 frames are
available. For shorter conversations, the number of
comparisons and the probability of success both de-
crease quadratically with the number of frames avail-
able.
The slid pair attack can be prevented or mitigated
by increasing the size of the internal state relevant
to the key size, using an appropriate loading process
and reducing the similarity of the state update func-
tions of the initialisation process and keystream gen-
eration. The first two of these measures increase the
size of phase shifts for slid keystreams. The third
measure decreases the probability of obtaining shifted
keystream from existing slid pairs. In combination,
this will reduce the chance of attacking ciphers using
slid pairs.
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A The Key and IV relationship
Clocking A, B and C registers (case 1)
This case assumes that the contents of the three
stages s8a, s
10
b and s
10
c are the same (s
8
a = s
10
b = s
10
c ).
This assumption is included in the key dependent cal-
culation that is presented later.
The secret key for both pairs are the same (accord-
ing to our assumption). The relationship between the
first IV, v, and the second IV, v′ is computed and
shown as follow.
Note: c0, c1 . . . c21 are secret key dependent constants
(each ci is obtained by XORing some of key bits).
They can be calculated easily using the Gaussian
elimination of the system of equations.
δ0 = c0 ⊕ v1
δ1 = c1 ⊕ v0 ⊕ v1 ⊕ v2
δ2 = c2 ⊕ v2 ⊕ v3
δ3 = c3 ⊕ v3 ⊕ v4
δ4 = c4 ⊕ v4 ⊕ v5
δ5 = c5 ⊕ v5 ⊕ v6
δ6 = c6 ⊕ v6 ⊕ v7
δ7 = c7 ⊕ v7 ⊕ v8
δ8 = c8 ⊕ v8 ⊕ v9
δ9 = c9 ⊕ v9 ⊕ v10
δ10 = c10 ⊕ v10 ⊕ v11
δ11 = c11 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v12
δ12 = c12 ⊕ v12 ⊕ v13
δ13 = c13 ⊕ v0 ⊕ v13 ⊕ v14
δ14 = c14 ⊕ v0 ⊕ v14 ⊕ v15
δ15 = c15 ⊕ v0 ⊕ v15 ⊕ v16
δ16 = c16 ⊕ v0 ⊕ v16 ⊕ v17
δ17 = c17 ⊕ v17 ⊕ v18
δ18 = c18 ⊕ v0 ⊕ v18 ⊕ v19
δ19 = c19 ⊕ v19 ⊕ v20
δ20 = c20 ⊕ v0 ⊕ v20 ⊕ v21
δ21 = c21 ⊕ v21
From the Gaussian elimination of the remaining
system equations of the matrix representation, there
are 20 free key bits which are free to be chosen. These
bits are {k42, k44, k45, k47, k48, k49, k50, k51, k52,
k53, k54, k55, k56, k57, k58, k59, k60, k61, k62, k63}.
Therefore, 44 bits are dependent on the 20 key bits
and 4 IV bits, {v0, v3, v11, v13, }. Therefore, there is a
slid pair shifted by one bit for the same key and two
different IV’s with probability of 2−44.The following
equations show how to form the 44 key bits from other
20 key bits and 4 IV bits.
k0 =k44 ⊕ k45 ⊕ k47 ⊕ k50 ⊕ k51 ⊕ k54 ⊕ k57 ⊕ k62 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v13
k1 =k42 ⊕ k45 ⊕ k50 ⊕ k51 ⊕ k52 ⊕ k55 ⊕ k58 ⊕ k59 ⊕ k60 ⊕ k63
⊕ v0
k2 =k44 ⊕ k45 ⊕ k47 ⊕ k48 ⊕ k50 ⊕ k52 ⊕ k53 ⊕ k54 ⊕ k55 ⊕ k58
⊕ k59 ⊕ k61 ⊕ k62 ⊕ k63 ⊕ v0 ⊕ v3 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v13
k3 =k42 ⊕ k48 ⊕ k49 ⊕ k50 ⊕ k52 ⊕ k53 ⊕ k56 ⊕ k59 ⊕ k62 ⊕ k63
⊕ v11 ⊕ v13
k4 =k42 ⊕ k47 ⊕ k48 ⊕ k53 ⊕ k56 ⊕ k57 ⊕ k58 ⊕ k59 ⊕ k61 ⊕ k63
⊕ v0 ⊕ v3
k5 =k45 ⊕ k48 ⊕ k50 ⊕ k52 ⊕ k53 ⊕ k55 ⊕ k57 ⊕ k59 ⊕ k61 ⊕ k63
⊕ v0 ⊕ v3 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v13
k6 =k42 ⊕ k45 ⊕ k49 ⊕ k50 ⊕ k52 ⊕ k53 ⊕ k55 ⊕ k56 ⊕ k58 ⊕ k62
⊕ v11 ⊕ v13
k7 =k42 ⊕ k44 ⊕ k45 ⊕ k47 ⊕ k49 ⊕ k51 ⊕ k56 ⊕ k58 ⊕ k59 ⊕ k61
⊕ v0 ⊕ v3 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v13
k8 =k42 ⊕ k49 ⊕ k50 ⊕ k53 ⊕ k54 ⊕ k55 ⊕ k57 ⊕ k58 ⊕ k60 ⊕ k61
⊕ k63 ⊕ v0 ⊕ v3 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v13
k9 =k42 ⊕ k44 ⊕ k49 ⊕ k50 ⊕ k52 ⊕ k57 ⊕ k59 ⊕ k60 ⊕ v0 ⊕ v3
k10 =k44 ⊕ k45 ⊕ k47 ⊕ k49 ⊕ k50 ⊕ k52 ⊕ k55 ⊕ k57 ⊕ k63 ⊕ v3
k11 =k49 ⊕ k51 ⊕ k52 ⊕ k54 ⊕ k57 ⊕ k58 ⊕ k61 ⊕ k62 ⊕ v0 ⊕ v11
⊕ v13
k12 =k42 ⊕ k48 ⊕ k49 ⊕ k50 ⊕ k51 ⊕ k52 ⊕ k56 ⊕ k57 ⊕ k58 ⊕ k59
⊕ k60 ⊕ k61 ⊕ k63 ⊕ v0
k13 =k44 ⊕ k45 ⊕ k49 ⊕ k50 ⊕ k52 ⊕ k55 ⊕ k57 ⊕ k60 ⊕ k61 ⊕ k62
⊕ v3 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v13
k14 =k42 ⊕ k47 ⊕ k48 ⊕ k49 ⊕ k51 ⊕ k52 ⊕ k53 ⊕ k56 ⊕ k57 ⊕ k58
⊕ k62 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v13
k15 =k42 ⊕ k47 ⊕ k51 ⊕ k52 ⊕ k53 ⊕ k56 ⊕ k57 ⊕ k60 ⊕ k61 ⊕ k63
⊕ v3
k16 =k45 ⊕ k47 ⊕ k50 ⊕ k51 ⊕ k54 ⊕ k61 ⊕ v3 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v13
k17 =k42 ⊕ k45 ⊕ k47 ⊕ k49 ⊕ k50 ⊕ k51 ⊕ k55 ⊕ k57 ⊕ k61 ⊕ k62
⊕ k63 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v13
k18 =k42 ⊕ k48 ⊕ k49 ⊕ k50 ⊕ k52 ⊕ k53 ⊕ k56 ⊕ k61 ⊕ v3
k19 =k45 ⊕ k47 ⊕ k48 ⊕ k49 ⊕ k52 ⊕ k54 ⊕ k58 ⊕ v0 ⊕ v3 ⊕ v11
⊕ v13
k20 =k42 ⊕ k45 ⊕ k48 ⊕ k49 ⊕ k51 ⊕ k52 ⊕ k53 ⊕ k54 ⊕ k59 ⊕ k60
⊕ v0 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v13
k21 =k42 ⊕ k44 ⊕ k45 ⊕ k48 ⊕ k49 ⊕ k51 ⊕ k52 ⊕ k54 ⊕ k58 ⊕ k61
⊕ v3 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v13
k22 =k42 ⊕ k44 ⊕ k45 ⊕ k49 ⊕ k54 ⊕ k55 ⊕ k58 ⊕ k60 ⊕ k62 ⊕ v3
k23 =k44 ⊕ k45 ⊕ k47 ⊕ k52 ⊕ k55 ⊕ k58 ⊕ k60 ⊕ k61 ⊕ k62 ⊕ v3
k24 =k49 ⊕ k50 ⊕ k52 ⊕ k54 ⊕ k57 ⊕ k59 ⊕ k63 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v13
k25 =k42 ⊕ k47 ⊕ k50 ⊕ k51 ⊕ k54 ⊕ k55 ⊕ k56 ⊕ k58 ⊕ k60 ⊕ k62
⊕ k63 ⊕ v0
k26 =k44 ⊕ k45 ⊕ k48 ⊕ k52 ⊕ k53 ⊕ k56 ⊕ k57 ⊕ k58 ⊕ k61 ⊕ k63
⊕ v3 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v13
k27 =k42 ⊕ k44 ⊕ k45 ⊕ k48 ⊕ k51 ⊕ k52 ⊕ k53 ⊕ k57 ⊕ k58 ⊕ k59
⊕ k61 ⊕ k63 ⊕ v0
k28 =k45 ⊕ k48 ⊕ k49 ⊕ k52 ⊕ k53 ⊕ k54 ⊕ k55 ⊕ k56 ⊕ k57 ⊕ k59
⊕ k62 ⊕ k63 ⊕ v0 ⊕ v3
k29 =k45 ⊕ k47 ⊕ k49 ⊕ k51 ⊕ k52 ⊕ k54 ⊕ k57 ⊕ k58 ⊕ k62 ⊕ v11
⊕ v13
k30 =k42 ⊕ k52 ⊕ k53 ⊕ k55 ⊕ k58 ⊕ k60 ⊕ k63 ⊕ v0
k31 =k44 ⊕ k45 ⊕ k51 ⊕ k54 ⊕ k55 ⊕ k56 ⊕ k58 ⊕ k61 ⊕ v3 ⊕ v11
⊕ v13
k32 =k42 ⊕ k44 ⊕ k45 ⊕ k48 ⊕ k49 ⊕ k51 ⊕ k54 ⊕ k55 ⊕ k56 ⊕ k57
⊕ k59 ⊕ k61 ⊕ k63
k33 =k45 ⊕ k47 ⊕ k50 ⊕ k51 ⊕ k52 ⊕ k54 ⊕ k55 ⊕ k57 ⊕ k60 ⊕ k61
⊕ k62 ⊕ v3
k34 =k44 ⊕ k47 ⊕ k49 ⊕ k55 ⊕ k58 ⊕ k62 ⊕ k63
k35 =k45 ⊕ k48 ⊕ k50 ⊕ k56 ⊕ k59 ⊕ k63 ⊕ v0
k36 =k44 ⊕ k45 ⊕ k47 ⊕ k51 ⊕ k53 ⊕ k54 ⊕ k55 ⊕ k56 ⊕ k57 ⊕ k59
⊕ k60 ⊕ k61 ⊕ v0 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v13
k37 =k42 ⊕ k44 ⊕ k48 ⊕ k49 ⊕ k52 ⊕ k54 ⊕ k56 ⊕ k57 ⊕ k58 ⊕ k59
⊕ k60 ⊕ k63 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v13
k38 =k42 ⊕ k44 ⊕ k48 ⊕ k50 ⊕ k53 ⊕ k55 ⊕ k56 ⊕ k62 ⊕ v0 ⊕ v3
⊕ v11 ⊕ v13
k39 =k42 ⊕ k44 ⊕ k45 ⊕ k52 ⊕ k55 ⊕ k58 ⊕ k60 ⊕ k61 ⊕ k62 ⊕ k63
⊕ v3
k40 =k44 ⊕ k45 ⊕ k47 ⊕ k50 ⊕ k52 ⊕ k53 ⊕ k58 ⊕ k60 ⊕ k61 ⊕ v0
⊕ v3
k41 =k47 ⊕ k48 ⊕ k50 ⊕ k52 ⊕ k54 ⊕ k55 ⊕ k56 ⊕ k59 ⊕ k60 ⊕ k61
⊕ k63 ⊕ v0 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v13
k43 =k48 ⊕ k49 ⊕ k50 ⊕ k51 ⊕ k53 ⊕ k58 ⊕ k59 ⊕ k60 ⊕ k61 ⊕ k62
⊕ k63 ⊕ v3
k46 =k47 ⊕ k48 ⊕ k50 ⊕ k53 ⊕ k54 ⊕ k56 ⊕ k59 ⊕ k60 ⊕ k62 ⊕ k63
⊕ v0
Clocking A and B registers (case 2)
This case assumes that the contents of the two stages
s8a and s
10
b are the same but differ from s
10
c (s
8
a =
s10b 6= s10c ). This assumption is included in the key
dependent calculation that is presented later.
The secret key for both pairs are the same (accord-
ing to our assumption). The relationship between the
first IV, v, and the second IV, v′ is computed and
shown as follow.
Note: d0, d1 . . . d21 are secret key dependent constants
(each di is obtained by XORing some of key bits).
They can be calculated using the Gaussian elimina-
tion of the system of equations.
δ0 =d0 ⊕ v1
δ1 =d1 ⊕ v0 ⊕ v1 ⊕ v2
δ2 =d2 ⊕ v2 ⊕ v3
δ3 =d3 ⊕ v3 ⊕ v4
δ4 =d4 ⊕ v4 ⊕ v5
δ5 =d5 ⊕ v5 ⊕ v6
δ6 =d6 ⊕ v6 ⊕ v7
δ7 =d7 ⊕ v7 ⊕ v8
δ8 =d8 ⊕ v8 ⊕ v9
δ9 =d9 ⊕ v9 ⊕ v10
δ10 =d10 ⊕ v10 ⊕ v11
δ11 =d11 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v12
δ12 =d12 ⊕ v12 ⊕ v13
δ13 =d13 ⊕ v0 ⊕ v13 ⊕ v14
δ14 =d14 ⊕ v0 ⊕ v14 ⊕ v15
δ15 =d15 ⊕ v0 ⊕ v15 ⊕ v16
δ16 =d16 ⊕ v0 ⊕ v16 ⊕ v17
δ17 =d17 ⊕ v17 ⊕ v18
δ18 =d18 ⊕ v0 ⊕ v18 ⊕ v19
δ19 =d19 ⊕ v19 ⊕ v20
δ20 =d20 ⊕ v0 ⊕ v20 ⊕ v21
δ21 =d21 ⊕ v21
From the Gaussian elimination of the remaining
system equations, there are 22 free key bits which are
free to be chosen. These bits are {k42, k43, k44, k45,
k47, k48, k49, k50, k51, k52, k53, k54, k55, k56, k57, k58,
k59, k60, k61, k62, k63}. Therefore, 42 bits are depen-
dent on the 22 key bits and 22 IV bits. Therefore,
there is a slid pair shifted by one bit for the same key
and two different IV’s with probability of 2−42.The
following equations show how to form the 42 key bits
from other 22 key bits and 22 IV bits.
k0 =k42 ⊕ k44 ⊕ k45 ⊕ k51 ⊕ k53 ⊕ k55 ⊕ k59 ⊕ k60 ⊕ k61 ⊕ k63
⊕ v1 ⊕ v2 ⊕ v3 ⊕ v4 ⊕ v6 ⊕ v7 ⊕ v9 ⊕ v14 ⊕ v15 ⊕ v16 ⊕ v21
⊕ 1
k1 =k42 ⊕ k45 ⊕ k47 ⊕ k51 ⊕ k52 ⊕ k53 ⊕ k54 ⊕ k55 ⊕ k57 ⊕ k58
⊕ k60 ⊕ k61 ⊕ k63 ⊕ v1 ⊕ v2 ⊕ v3 ⊕ v4 ⊕ v5 ⊕ v9 ⊕ v10 ⊕ v11
⊕ v12 ⊕ v15 ⊕ v16 ⊕ v19 ⊕ v20 ⊕ v21
k2 =k43 ⊕ k46 ⊕ k48 ⊕ k52 ⊕ k53 ⊕ k54 ⊕ k55 ⊕ k56 ⊕ k58 ⊕ k59
⊕ k61 ⊕ k62 ⊕ v0 ⊕ v2 ⊕ v3 ⊕ v4 ⊕ v5 ⊕ v6 ⊕ v10 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v12
⊕ v13 ⊕ v16 ⊕ v17 ⊕ v20 ⊕ v21
k3 =k44 ⊕ k47 ⊕ k49 ⊕ k53 ⊕ k54 ⊕ k55 ⊕ k56 ⊕ k57 ⊕ k59 ⊕ k60
⊕ k62 ⊕ k63 ⊕ v1 ⊕ v3 ⊕ v4 ⊕ v5 ⊕ v6 ⊕ v7 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v12
⊕ v13 ⊕ v14 ⊕ v17 ⊕ v18 ⊕ v21
k4 =k45 ⊕ k48 ⊕ k50 ⊕ k54 ⊕ k55 ⊕ k56 ⊕ k57 ⊕ k58 ⊕ k60 ⊕ k61
⊕ k63 ⊕ v0 ⊕ v2 ⊕ v4 ⊕ v5 ⊕ v6 ⊕ v7 ⊕ v8 ⊕ v12 ⊕ v13
⊕ v14 ⊕ v15 ⊕ v18 ⊕ v19
k5 =k46 ⊕ k49 ⊕ k51 ⊕ k55 ⊕ k56 ⊕ k57 ⊕ k58 ⊕ k59 ⊕ k61 ⊕ k62
⊕ v0 ⊕ v1 ⊕ v3 ⊕ v5 ⊕ v6 ⊕ v7 ⊕ v8 ⊕ v9 ⊕ v13 ⊕ v14 ⊕ v15
⊕ v16 ⊕ v19 ⊕ v20
k6 =k47 ⊕ k50 ⊕ k52 ⊕ k56 ⊕ k57 ⊕ k58 ⊕ k59 ⊕ k60 ⊕ k62 ⊕ k63
⊕ v1 ⊕ v2 ⊕ v4 ⊕ v6 ⊕ v7 ⊕ v8 ⊕ v9 ⊕ v10 ⊕ v14 ⊕ v15
⊕ v16 ⊕ v17 ⊕ v20 ⊕ v21
k7 =k48 ⊕ k51 ⊕ k53 ⊕ k57 ⊕ k58 ⊕ k59 ⊕ k60 ⊕ k61 ⊕ k63 ⊕ v0
⊕ v2 ⊕ v3 ⊕ v5 ⊕ v7 ⊕ v8 ⊕ v9 ⊕ v10 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v15 ⊕ v16
⊕ v17 ⊕ v18 ⊕ v21
k8 =k49 ⊕ k52 ⊕ k54 ⊕ k58 ⊕ k59 ⊕ k60 ⊕ k61 ⊕ k62 ⊕ v0 ⊕ v1
⊕ v3 ⊕ v4 ⊕ v6 ⊕ v8 ⊕ v9 ⊕ v10 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v12 ⊕ v16 ⊕ v17
⊕ v18 ⊕ v19
k9 =k50 ⊕ k53 ⊕ k55 ⊕ k59 ⊕ k60 ⊕ k61 ⊕ k62 ⊕ k63 ⊕ v1 ⊕ v2
⊕ v4 ⊕ v5 ⊕ v7 ⊕ v9 ⊕ v10 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v12 ⊕ v13 ⊕ v17 ⊕ v18
⊕ v19 ⊕ v20
k10 =k51 ⊕ k54 ⊕ k56 ⊕ k60 ⊕ k61 ⊕ k62 ⊕ k63 ⊕ v0 ⊕ v2 ⊕ v3
⊕ v5 ⊕ v6 ⊕ v8 ⊕ v10 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v12 ⊕ v13 ⊕ v14 ⊕ v18 ⊕ v19
⊕ v20 ⊕ v21
k11 =k52 ⊕ k55 ⊕ k57 ⊕ k61 ⊕ k62 ⊕ k63 ⊕ v0 ⊕ v1 ⊕ v3 ⊕ v4
⊕ v6 ⊕ v7 ⊕ v9 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v12 ⊕ v13 ⊕ v14 ⊕ v15 ⊕ v19
⊕ v20 ⊕ v21
k12 =k53 ⊕ k56 ⊕ k58 ⊕ k62 ⊕ k63 ⊕ v0 ⊕ v1 ⊕ v2 ⊕ v4 ⊕ v5
⊕ v7 ⊕ v8 ⊕ v10 ⊕ v12 ⊕ v13 ⊕ v14 ⊕ v15 ⊕ v16 ⊕ v20 ⊕ v21
k13 =k54 ⊕ k57 ⊕ k59 ⊕ k63 ⊕ v0 ⊕ v1 ⊕ v2 ⊕ v3 ⊕ v5 ⊕ v6
⊕ v8 ⊕ v9 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v13 ⊕ v14 ⊕ v15 ⊕ v16 ⊕ v17 ⊕ v21
k14 =k42 ⊕ k44 ⊕ k45 ⊕ k51 ⊕ k53 ⊕ k58 ⊕ k59 ⊕ k61 ⊕ k63
⊕ v0 ⊕ v10 ⊕ v12 ⊕ v17 ⊕ v18 ⊕ v21 ⊕ 1
k15 =k42 ⊕ k45 ⊕ k47 ⊕ k51 ⊕ k52 ⊕ k53 ⊕ k54 ⊕ k55 ⊕ k56
⊕ k57 ⊕ k58 ⊕ k59 ⊕ k60 ⊕ k63 ⊕ v7 ⊕ v8 ⊕ v9 ⊕ v12 ⊕ v13
⊕ v17 ⊕ v18 ⊕ v20 ⊕ v21
k16 =k43 ⊕ k46 ⊕ k48 ⊕ k52 ⊕ k53 ⊕ k54 ⊕ k55 ⊕ k56 ⊕ k57 ⊕ k58
⊕ k59 ⊕ k60 ⊕ k61 ⊕ v0 ⊕ v8 ⊕ v9 ⊕ v10 ⊕ v13 ⊕ v14
⊕ v18 ⊕ v19 ⊕ v21
k17 =k42 ⊕ k45 ⊕ k47 ⊕ k49 ⊕ k51 ⊕ k54 ⊕ k56 ⊕ k57 ⊕ k58 ⊕ k62
⊕ k63 ⊕ v2 ⊕ v3 ⊕ v4 ⊕ v6 ⊕ v7 ⊕ v10 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v16 ⊕ v19
⊕ v20 ⊕ v21 ⊕ 1
k18 =k44 ⊕ k45 ⊕ k47 ⊕ k48 ⊕ k50 ⊕ k52 ⊕ k55 ⊕ k56 ⊕ k60 ⊕ k61
⊕ k62 ⊕ k63 ⊕ v2 ⊕ v5 ⊕ v6 ⊕ v7 ⊕ v14 ⊕ v15 ⊕ v16
⊕ v19 ⊕ v21 ⊕ 1
k19 =k43 ⊕ k44 ⊕ k47 ⊕ k48 ⊕ k49 ⊕ k51 ⊕ k53 ⊕ k58 ⊕ k59 ⊕ k60
⊕ k63 ⊕ v2 ⊕ v4 ⊕ v7 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v12 ⊕ v14 ⊕ v19 ⊕ 1
k20 =k42 ⊕ k43 ⊕ k44 ⊕ k45 ⊕ k46 ⊕ k47 ⊕ k48 ⊕ k49 ⊕ k50 ⊕ k51
⊕ k52 ⊕ k53 ⊕ k54 ⊕ k55 ⊕ k56 ⊕ k57 ⊕ k58 ⊕ k59 ⊕ k60
⊕ k61 ⊕ k62 ⊕ k63 ⊕ v1 ⊕ v3 ⊕ v5 ⊕ v7 ⊕ v9 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v13
⊕ v15 ⊕ v17 ⊕ v19 ⊕ v21
k21 =k42 ⊕ k43 ⊕ k46 ⊕ k47 ⊕ k48 ⊕ k49 ⊕ k50 ⊕ k52 ⊕ k54 ⊕ k56
⊕ k57 ⊕ k58 ⊕ k62 ⊕ v0 ⊕ v1 ⊕ v3 ⊕ v7 ⊕ v8 ⊕ v9 ⊕ v10
⊕ v12 ⊕ v15 ⊕ v18 ⊕ v20 ⊕ v21 ⊕ 1
k22 =k45 ⊕ k46 ⊕ k48 ⊕ k49 ⊕ k50 ⊕ k51 ⊕ k53 ⊕ k55 ⊕ k56 ⊕ k60
⊕ k61 ⊕ k62 ⊕ k63 ⊕ v0 ⊕ v1 ⊕ v3 ⊕ v6 ⊕ v9 ⊕ v10 ⊕ v12
⊕ v13 ⊕ v14 ⊕ v15 ⊕ v17 ⊕ v20 ⊕ v21 ⊕ 1
k23 =k42 ⊕ k43 ⊕ k49 ⊕ k50 ⊕ k52 ⊕ k53 ⊕ k54 ⊕ k55 ⊕ k58 ⊕ k61
⊕ v2 ⊕ v4 ⊕ v8 ⊕ v9 ⊕ v10 ⊕ v12 ⊕ v13 ⊕ v14 ⊕ v15 ⊕ v16
⊕ v17 ⊕ v18 ⊕ v19 ⊕ v20
k24 =k43 ⊕ k44 ⊕ k50 ⊕ k51 ⊕ k53 ⊕ k54 ⊕ k55 ⊕ k56 ⊕ k59 ⊕ k62
⊕ v3 ⊕ v5 ⊕ v9 ⊕ v10 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v13 ⊕ v14 ⊕ v15 ⊕ v16
⊕ v17 ⊕ v18 ⊕ v19 ⊕ v20 ⊕ v21
k25 =k44 ⊕ k45 ⊕ k51 ⊕ k52 ⊕ k54 ⊕ k55 ⊕ k56 ⊕ k57 ⊕ k60 ⊕ k63
⊕ v4 ⊕ v6 ⊕ v10 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v12 ⊕ v14 ⊕ v15 ⊕ v16 ⊕ v17 ⊕ v18
⊕ v19 ⊕ v20 ⊕ v21
k26 =k45 ⊕ k46 ⊕ k52 ⊕ k53 ⊕ k55 ⊕ k56 ⊕ k57 ⊕ k58 ⊕ k61 ⊕ v0
⊕ v5 ⊕ v7 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v12 ⊕ v13 ⊕ v15 ⊕ v16 ⊕ v17 ⊕ v18
⊕ v19 ⊕ v20 ⊕ v21
k27 =k46 ⊕ k47 ⊕ k53 ⊕ k54 ⊕ k56 ⊕ k57 ⊕ k58 ⊕ k59 ⊕ k62 ⊕ v1
⊕ v6 ⊕ v8 ⊕ v12 ⊕ v13 ⊕ v14 ⊕ v16 ⊕ v17 ⊕ v18 ⊕ v19
⊕ v20 ⊕ v21
k28 =k47 ⊕ k48 ⊕ k54 ⊕ k55 ⊕ k57 ⊕ k58 ⊕ k59 ⊕ k60 ⊕ k63 ⊕ v2
⊕ v7 ⊕ v9 ⊕ v13 ⊕ v14 ⊕ v15 ⊕ v17 ⊕ v18 ⊕ v19 ⊕ v20 ⊕ v21
k29 =k48 ⊕ k49 ⊕ k55 ⊕ k56 ⊕ k58 ⊕ k59 ⊕ k60 ⊕ k61 ⊕ v0 ⊕ v3
⊕ v8 ⊕ v10 ⊕ v14 ⊕ v15 ⊕ v16 ⊕ v18 ⊕ v19 ⊕ v20 ⊕ v21
k30 =k49 ⊕ k50 ⊕ k56 ⊕ k57 ⊕ k59 ⊕ k60 ⊕ k61 ⊕ k62 ⊕ v1 ⊕ v4
⊕ v9 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v15 ⊕ v16 ⊕ v17 ⊕ v19 ⊕ v20 ⊕ v21
k31 =k50 ⊕ k51 ⊕ k57 ⊕ k58 ⊕ k60 ⊕ k61 ⊕ k62 ⊕ k63 ⊕ v2 ⊕ v5
⊕ v10 ⊕ v12 ⊕ v16 ⊕ v17 ⊕ v18 ⊕ v20 ⊕ v21
k32 =k51 ⊕ k52 ⊕ k58 ⊕ k59 ⊕ k61 ⊕ k62 ⊕ k63 ⊕ v0 ⊕ v3 ⊕ v6 ⊕ v11
⊕ v13 ⊕ v17 ⊕ v18 ⊕ v19 ⊕ v21
k33 =k52 ⊕ k53 ⊕ k59 ⊕ k60 ⊕ k62 ⊕ k63 ⊕ v0 ⊕ v1 ⊕ v4 ⊕ v7 ⊕ v12
⊕ v14 ⊕ v18 ⊕ v19 ⊕ v20
k34 =k53 ⊕ k54 ⊕ k60 ⊕ k61 ⊕ k63 ⊕ v0 ⊕ v1 ⊕ v2 ⊕ v5 ⊕ v8 ⊕ v13
⊕ v15 ⊕ v19 ⊕ v20 ⊕ v21
k35 =k42 ⊕ k44 ⊕ k45 ⊕ k51 ⊕ k53 ⊕ k54 ⊕ k59 ⊕ k60 ⊕ k62 ⊕ k63
⊕ v0 ⊕ v4 ⊕ v7 ⊕ v15 ⊕ v20 ⊕ 1
k36 =k44 ⊕ k47 ⊕ k52 ⊕ k54 ⊕ k55 ⊕ k56 ⊕ k57 ⊕ k58 ⊕ k59 ⊕ k62
⊕ k63 ⊕ v1 ⊕ v2 ⊕ v3 ⊕ v4 ⊕ v5 ⊕ v6 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v12 ⊕ v14
⊕ v15 ⊕ v17 ⊕ v19 ⊕ v20 ⊕ v21 ⊕ 1
k37 =k42 ⊕ k43 ⊕ k45 ⊕ k46 ⊕ k47 ⊕ k48 ⊕ k51 ⊕ k59 ⊕ k60 ⊕ k62
⊕ v1 ⊕ v2 ⊕ v3 ⊕ v4 ⊕ v5 ⊕ v6 ⊕ v8 ⊕ v9 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v13
⊕ v15 ⊕ v16 ⊕ v17 ⊕ v18 ⊕ v19
k38 =k42 ⊕ k43 ⊕ k45 ⊕ k46 ⊕ k47 ⊕ k48 ⊕ k49 ⊕ k51 ⊕ k52 ⊕ k53
⊕ k55 ⊕ k59 ⊕ v1 ⊕ v5 ⊕ v10 ⊕ v12 ⊕ v15 ⊕ v17 ⊕ v18
⊕ v19 ⊕ v20 ⊕ v21 ⊕ 1
k39 =k42 ⊕ k44 ⊕ k48 ⊕ k49 ⊕ k50 ⊕ k51 ⊕ k52 ⊕ k54 ⊕ k55 ⊕ k57
⊕ k58 ⊕ k60 ⊕ k62 ⊕ k63 ⊕ v0 ⊕ v1 ⊕ v2 ⊕ v6 ⊕ v7 ⊕ v8
⊕ v9 ⊕ v12 ⊕ v13 ⊕ v16 ⊕ v17 ⊕ v18
k40 =k43 ⊕ k45 ⊕ k49 ⊕ k50 ⊕ k51 ⊕ k52 ⊕ k53 ⊕ k55 ⊕ k56 ⊕ k58
⊕ k59 ⊕ k61 ⊕ k63 ⊕ v0 ⊕ v1 ⊕ v2 ⊕ v3 ⊕ v7 ⊕ v8 ⊕ v9
⊕ v10 ⊕ v13 ⊕ v14 ⊕ v17 ⊕ v18 ⊕ v19
k41 =k42 ⊕ k45 ⊕ k46 ⊕ k50 ⊕ k52 ⊕ k54 ⊕ k55 ⊕ k56 ⊕ k57 ⊕ k61
⊕ k62 ⊕ k63 ⊕ v0 ⊕ v6 ⊕ v7 ⊕ v8 ⊕ v10 ⊕ v11 ⊕ v16 ⊕ v18
⊕ v19 ⊕ v20 ⊕ v21 ⊕ 1
Cases 3 and 4 can be analysed similarly to the
analysis of cases 1 and 2 to find the relationship be-
tween the first IV, v, and the second IV, v′. In ad-
dition, the free key bits and the conditions that are
required for the key bits to get the slid pairs can also
be determined.
